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Leibniz’s account of probability has come into better focus over the past 
decades.1 However, less attention has been paid to a certain domain of appli-
cation of Leibniz’s account, that is, its application to the moral domain—
the sphere of action, choice and practice. This is significant, as Leibniz had 
things to say about applying probability theory to the moral domain, and 
thought the matter quite relevant. Leibniz’s work in this area is conducted 
at a high level of abstraction. It establishes a proof of concept, rather than 
concrete guidelines for how to apply calculations to specific cases. Still, this 
abstract material does allow us to begin to construct a framework for think-
ing about Leibniz’s approach to the ethical side of probability.
1 Gerhardt, “Leibniz und Pascal”; Couturat, La Logique de Leibniz, esp. chap. VI.28; Keynes, A 
Treatise on Probability, Hacking, “The Leibniz-Carnap program for inductive logic”; Hacking, The 
Emergence of Probability; Knecht, La Logique chez Leibniz, esp. chap. VII.5; Daston, Classical 
Probability in the Enlightenment.
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Here I will begin by outlining the prominent but contested view of 
moral probabilism that was available in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, as well as Leibniz’s objections to it. Then I will outline Leibniz’s 
views on how concerns about probability apply to the moral domain. 
Drawing on the correspondence between Leibniz and the mathemati-
cian Jakob Bernoulli (1655–1705), I will also highlight two limits to the 
former’s view of the application of probability to moral aﬀairs. I conclude 
that Leibniz enthusiastically supported the expansive use of a ‘logic of 
chance’, but also saw certain limitations. Let me begin by providing a 
historical backdrop to Leibniz’s discussion of probability, by laying out an 
approach that he rejected, namely scholastic moral probabilism.
1  Moral Probabilism
In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was a significant 
movement in moral theology, namely that of moral scholastic proba-
bilism. Probabilism has its background in sixteenth-century works on 
conscience, and grew more prominent in the latter half of the seven-
teenth century, especially in circles where casuistry had a central place.2 
Notable proponents are authors such as Honoré Fabri (1608–88), Juan 
Caramuel y Lobkowitz (1606–82) and Samuel Rachelius (1628–91), 
among others.3 Probabilism comes in diﬀerent versions, and developed 
significantly over the course of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
In broad outline, probabilism is a method for decision-making under 
uncertainty. It is applied when there are multiple conflicting opinions, 
each supporting diﬀerent courses of action. How can one act in such 
case? Probabilism, as the name suggest, is the idea that one ought to 
determine whether the opinions at issue are probable or not. Probabilism 
2 For more detailed background discussions, see: Bellhouse, “Probability in the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries”; Jonsen and Toulmin The Abuse of Casuistry; Keenan and Shannon, The Context of 
Casuistry; Schüssler, “Scholastic probability as rational assertability” and “The anatomy of 
 probabilism”; and Braun and Vallance, Contexts of Conscience in Early Modern Europe, 1500–1750.
3 Some instances of central works in this period are: Lessius, De justitia et jure caeterisque virtutibus 
cardinalibus libri quatuor (1609); Fabri, Pithanophilus seu dialogus (1659); Lobkowitz, Apologema 
pro antiquissima doctrina de probabilitate (1663); Rachelius, Examen probabilitatis qvam  jesuitae 
novique casuistae theologiae suae moralis fundamentum constituerunt (1664).
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says that it is permissible to follow any opinion that is “probable”. As 
stated by the influential sixteenth-century author Bartolomé de Medina: 
“… but that opinion is probable, when wise people assert it, & optimal 
arguments confirm it”.4 In short, an opinion counts as probable if it is 
supported by either reason or authority.5
Consider a schematic example. Suppose you wonder whether it is 
morally problematic to charge interest on a loan. Let opinion A be that 
it is morally problematic to charge interest, and opinion B that it is not 
morally problematic to charge interest. According to scholastic moral 
probabilism, if only opinion A is probable then it is permissible to fol-
low A; if only B is probable then it is permissible to follow B; if both A 
and B are probable, then one can permissibly accept either A or B (see: 
Table 1).
It may be thought surprising that doctrine A and doctrine B can 
both count as probable, given that they are incompatible. How could 
it be both morally problematic and not morally problematic to charge 
interest? Such concern only helps clarify the framework in which these 
authors operate. Probabilists seek to set out the requirements for prac-
tical rationality under conditions of uncertainty. Their framework 
oﬀers a way of prohibiting the unfounded acceptance of just any doc-
trine. A doctrine has to be supported by reason or authority for it to 
4 In: Medina, Expositio in primam secundae angelici doctoris d. Thomae Aquinatis (1580), q. 19, art. 
6, 179. I read Medina here as giving two suﬃcient conditions, not two necessary and jointly suﬃ-
cient conditions (that is, something is probable when supported by reason; something can also 
probable when it is supported by authority).
5 Alternative positions in the same spirit are “probabiliorism” (the view that one ought to follow 
what is more probable) and “tutiorism” (the view that one ought to follow what is least risky). Here 
I will focus on probabilism, given that this is most central as a background for Leibniz’s work.
Table 1 Decision matrix 
for moral probabilism Doctrine A Doctrine B
Permissible 
to follow
Not probable Not probable —
Not probable Probable B
Probable Not probable A
Probable Probable A or B
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be acceptable.6 At the same time, probabilists are not concerned with 
identifying which position is “right”, or even which is most probable. 
Their strategy can  accommodate a plurality of opinions; a space for rea-
sonable disagreement.7 If both A and B receive support—be it rational 
or authoritative—that does not mean that both positions are correct. It 
only means that it is not impermissible to follow either option.
2  Leibniz Rejects Probabilism
In the later seventeenth century, scholastic moral probabilism was critically 
received, especially in Protestant and Jansenist circles. Antoine Arnauld 
(1612–94), for example, writes in a treatise from the 1640s against this 
strand of moral theology of the Jesuits.8 Blaise Pascal (1623–62) mocks 
moral probabilism in his pseudonymously published Provincial Letters 
(published 1656–7).9 The key objections made against scholastic probabi-
lism are twofold. First, one major concern is that probabilism will end up 
being too permissive, such that it will lead to a lax morality. To understand 
why this may be so, suppose that you contemplate committing fraud. The 
idea is that you will always be able to find some reason or some author-
6 As Rudolf Schüssler has brought out in recent work (esp. Schüssler, “Scholastic Probability as 
Rational Assertability”), the framework within which to understand the probabilistic method is 
one motivated by a concern about the grounds of testimony, as well as about creating a baseline for 
rational assertability.
7 Schüssler (“Scholastic Probability as Rational Assertability”, esp. 210ﬀ., 217) also discusses how a 
central motivation for Medina was to find ways of bracketing one’s personal opinion to accom-
modate a pluralism of opinions, and the possibility of reasonable disagreement among 
individuals.
8 Arnauld writes about the proposition “The authority of a good and learned doctor renders an 
opinion probable”: “This proposition is pernicious, & introduces an infinity of absurdities in all 
matters of moral doctrine” (my translation). Arnauld, La théologie morale des Jésuites, et nouveaux 
casuistes (1644), prop. XXVI.
9 In: Louis de Montalte (= Blaise Pascal), Les provinciales ou Lettres escrites par Louis Montalte a un 
Provincial de ses amis, & aux RR. PP. Jesuites: Sur la Morale & la Politique de ces Peres. A statement 
in the middle of the sixth letter portrays probabilism as nothing but a sheepish route to work away 
contradictions between statements from various church authorities. One of the interlocutors says: 
“You now see how, either by the interpretation of terms, by the observation of favourable circum-
stances, or by the aid of the double probability of pro and con, we always contrive to reconcile 
those seeming contradictions which occasioned you so much surprise, without ever touching on 
the decisions of Scripture, councils, or popes.”
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ity that permits fraudulence, hence rendering this opinion “probable”, 
and thereby permissible. It looks as though, by the lights of probabilism, 
practically all kinds of behaviour can be rendered permissible. This great 
permissiveness made probabilism an objectionable approach to moral 
decision-making.
A second concern, perhaps even more troubling from a theoretical per-
spective, is that probabilism counts views as probable on the wrong sort 
of grounds. Say that you consider lying to someone. Is it permissible to 
do so? According to probabilism, that depends on whether some rea-
son or authority supports it. But strictly, whether something or someone 
supports it is wholly extrinsic to the phenomenon under consideration, 
namely that of lying.10 When someone wants to determine whether a 
certain course of action is permissible, why would it even be relevant to 
consider whether some authority (or reason) supported it?
Leibniz shares these concerns. This is a prominent subject in Leibniz’s 
correspondence with Landgrave Ernst of Hessen-Rheinfels in the early 
1690s. For example, in some of these letters Leibniz speaks of “… that 
strange opinion of the casuists, who maintain against the eternal laws of 
good sense, that in practice one can follow that opinion, which one knows 
to be less certain and less probable”.11 On the face of it, Leibniz may seem 
to be missing the point here, as probabilism recommends following an 
opinion that is probable, not that one can follow a less probable opinion. 
However, Leibniz’s concern, I take it, is that the structure of permissibility 
that probabilism recommends allows for opinions to be followed that one 
understands—that is, bracketing the probabilist’s technical definition—
to be less probable. One finds Leibniz make a like move elsewhere:
[…] the opinion of people whose authority is weighty is one of the things 
which can contribute to rendering an opinion likely (vraisemblable), 
but it is not what produces all the likelihood (vérisimilitude). And while 
Copernicus was almost alone in his opinion, it was still incomparably more 
likely (vraisemblable) than that of all the rest of the human race.12
10 Hacking, The Emergence of Probability, chap. 4, gives an extended discussion of the development 
of intrinsic as opposed to extrinsic conceptions of the probability of an event.
11 A I 7, 230.
12 NE 372–3.
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According to Leibniz, heliocentrism was in fact more, and geocentrism 
less, likely to be true, even though authorities in the mid-sixteenth 
century showed greater support for the latter than for the former. 
Probabilism, however, cannot capture how there could be degrees of 
likelihood independent of support by reason or authority. 
That Leibniz  cautions against moral probabilism need not be too surpris-
ing, given that he has said that it would condone practical actions that go 
against the eternal laws of good sense. In his correspondence with Landgrave 
Ernst, Leibniz sometimes classifies probabilism as dangerous: “… if it were 
not for the Protestants and the so called Jansenists and their sort … the 
highly damaging probabilism would have become dominant”.13 Hence 
Leibniz thinks that moral probabilism will have damaging consequences.
Further, Leibniz also voices the second concern mentioned above. He 
suggests that probabilism elevates opinions to the status of being “prob-
able” (and hence permissible) on the wrong grounds. For example, in 
his Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain [New Essays on Human 
Understanding] (1703–5), Leibniz writes, via his mouthpiece Théophile:
[…] the majority of the casuists who have written on probability have not 
understood its nature, founding it on authority like Aristotle, instead of 
founding it on likelihood as they ought to. Authority is not among the 
reasons that found likelihood (vraisemblance).14
Leibniz is not uniformly negative about casuistry.15 Nor does he resist 
in principle the idea of considering probability in the ethical domain. 
Rather, Leibniz holds that the particular approach to probability oﬀered 
in scholastic moral probabilism is harmful and misguided. As he recounts: 
“The default of the lax moralists in this article has been, to a large extent, 
to have a very limited and highly inadequate notion of the probable 
(probable).”16 In the next sections, I will outline Leibniz’s positive account 
of probability, and show how he takes it to be of use in the moral domain.
13 A I 7, 302.
14 NE 206.
15 One example of this is how in Dialogue between Poliander and Theophile (c.1678), Poliander sug-
gests that whatever the shortfalls of the casuists’ position, their work does have its merits in getting 
people to practise Christian virtues (LGR 145).
16 NE 372.
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3  Leibniz on Probability
Leibniz discusses probability in a host of writings, ranging from his 
 youthful studies on law and jurisprudence, to his mathematical texts, 
various correspondences, and his late work the Theodicée [Theodicy].17 In 
line with his objections to probabilism, Leibniz emphasizes more than 
once that in considering probability, one needs to be concerned with its 
foundation in the phenomena themselves. This comes up explicitly in a 
range of texts, for example in his work on a general science from the mid-
1680s, in which Leibniz says that probability is “drawn from the nature 
of things in proportion to what one can know, and what one can call the 
likelihood”.18 It also comes up in Leibniz’s response to Locke on prob-
ability. For example, in the Nouveaux Essais, immediately after Leibniz 
has again rejected scholastic probabilism, he continues by stating that:
[…] the probable is broader: one must draw it from the nature of things; 
and the opinion of people whose authority is weighty, is one of the things 
that may contribute in rendering an opinion plausible, but it is not what 
establishes all the likelihood.19
The core point for Leibniz is that if a certain proposition is prob-
able, then it has a certain likelihood or tendency of being true. This 
contrasts with, for example, the idea that if a proposition is probable, 
then there is certain testimonial support for it (as moral probabilists 
would have it), or that the subject would have a certain degree of belief 
in the proposition (as is more akin to a Bayesian approach). But for 
Leibniz, then, the phenomena captured in a probable proposition will 
17 Some relevant texts by Leibniz touching on probability are: De conditionibus [On conditions] 
(1665) (A VI 1, 97–150); Dissertatio de arte combinatoria [Dissertation on the art of combinations] 
(1666) (A VI 1, 163–230); shorter tracts on games of chance, annuities, and the estimation of the 
uncertain in the 1670s and 1680s; the project of developing a universal science (scientia generalis) 
(A VI 4 contains hundreds of distinct texts contributing to this project); Nouveaux Essais; Theodicée 
[Theodicy]; his correspondence with Landgrave Ernst of Hessen-Rheinfels in the 1690s, and with 
Jakob Bernoulli in the early 1700s. A relevant selection of Leibniz’s shorter texts dealing with 
chance and probability has been published in French by Marc Parmentier as L’estime de l’incertain 
(in his L’estime des apparances).
18 A VI 4, 692–713.
19 NE 373.
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have a certain  likelihood or tendency of being the case. Conjectures or 
estimates are to be founded precisely on this: knowledge of how easy 
(facile) or feasible (faisable) it is for certain outcomes to be realized. 
Leibniz gives the example of the throw of dice. It is equally easy, he 
says, to throw twelve as it is to throw eleven, as both can be thrown 
only in one way. But it is three times easier to throw seven, as it can 
be thrown in three diﬀerent ways.20 Here Leibniz errs in counting the 
combinations in this specific example. In fact, it is twice as easy to 
throw eleven than it is to throw twelve, and six times easier to throw 
seven than twelve.21 But this does not take away the fact that Leibniz 
may be correct in the spirit of his assessment: the likelihood of the 
truth of the proposition that I will throw twelve may very well be 
based in the likelihood of my throwing twelve.
Leibniz identifies a foundation for probabilities that lies with things 
out there in the world, and the ease or tendency for certain outcomes 
to be realized. Hence, Leibniz firmly views probability as an objec-
tive feature of the world.22 (In contemporary terminology, we can say 
Leibniz gives an “objective” interpretation of probability. However, in 
Leibniz’s thinking this converges with a logical interpretation, as I will 
describe below.23 Leibniz moreover takes these objective probabilities 
to be reflected in our cognition, or our degrees of knowledge.) Leibniz 
strongly resists the idea that probability is something subjective, hav-
ing to do with the degree to which we can be certain of an outcome:
20 GP III, 569–70. An English translation is available at http://www.leibniz-translations.com/bour-
guet1714.htm
21 Throwing a standard pair of dice can give 36 possible combinations. Only one of those (6 + 6) 
will give you a sum of twelve (probability 0.0278), whereas two of them would result in eleven (5 
+ 6 and 6 + 5, probability 0.0556).
22 Sometimes Leibniz speaks of probability as a degree of possibility, for example in De incerti aesti-
matione [On estimating the uncertain, September 1676]: “Probability is a degree of possibility [gradus 
possibilitatis]”. TI 569. The idea here is that when something is probable, there is a certain degree 
to which a certain outcome tends towards being realized. I will postpone the correlated metaphysi-
cal interpretation of this point to another occasion.
23 For overviews of the diﬀerent interpretations of probability, see Gillies, Philosophical Theories of 
Probability; Mellor, Probability: A Philosophical Introduction; Eagle, Philosophy of Probability: 
Contemporary Readings, Hájek “Interpretations of Probability”. Combining what are now distin-
guished as several interpretations of probability is not peculiar to Leibniz’s work, but rather a 
standard feature in approaches to probability prior to the 1820s, as is discussed in detail in Daston, 
Classical Probability in the Enlightenment.
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Consider however (imitating Mathematicians) certainty or truth to be like 
the whole; & probabilities [to be like] parts, such that probabilities would 
be to truths what an acute angle [is] to a right [angle].24
Leibniz emphasizes this in the short text De incerti aestimatione [On the 
estimation of the uncertain], written in 1676 during his stay in Paris, in 
which he treats degrees of probability as having to do not so much with 
uncertainty, but with the nature of objects. He states: “Probability is the 
degree of possibility (gradus possibilitatis)”, that is, the degree to which a 
certain thing can be realized.25
How does one study such objective probabilities? Leibniz regards the 
scientific investigation of probability as a branch of logic.26 Determining 
probabilities is conducted a priori, by assessing the likelihoods of a range 
of possible outcomes.27 Having an a priori character is compatible with 
being a science; just think of mathematics, which is often understood as 
the science of number, quantity and space. It is moreover compatible with 
being applied to concrete worldly cases. For while calculations of probabil-
ity are conducted a priori, Leibniz does take them to reflect actual ratios 
and tendencies out there in the world. Especially later on in his work, he 
becomes sensitive to how statistical information can be of use in assessing 
such ratios. (Though he does see limitations, as will be discussed later on.) 
A logic of chance would help assess the relations between propositions that 
are probable, and describe the types of inferences one can draw or argu-
ments one can make on that basis.28 Leibniz takes a logic of probability to 
24 Leibniz to Vincent Placcius, 20 January 1687 (A II 2, 145).
25 TI 569.
26 Here I use “science” in a way in which it would have been available to Leibniz in the seventeenth 
century, as what constitutes a field of systematic knowledge (cf. Lat. scientia, Fr. science, Ger. 
Wissenschaft). See also Ross, “The demarcation between metaphysics and other disciplines in the 
thought of Leibniz”. Maria Rosa Antognazza has recently argued (see her essay in this volume, 
“Philosophy and Science in Leibniz”) that Leibniz began to theorize science in contrast with metaphys-
ics, where the former is understood as the mathematical, mechanical study of natural phenomena, 
while the latter provides a foundational description of reality. Here I do not assume such contrast.
27 On these grounds scholars have often taken Leibniz to hold a “logical interpretation” of probabil-
ity, as later developed most prominently by Rudolf Carnap (Logical Foundations of Probability). 
Further, Hacking (“The Leibniz-Carnap Program for Inductive Logic”) is a central expositor of this 
view.
28 A similar approach was already present in Leibniz’s legal and juridical writings. There Leibniz 
represents something’s being probable as a fraction (“1/2”), where the other extremes are designated 
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contrast with, and to complement a standard logic dealing with demon-
stration and deductive inferences. For example, in the Theodicée Leibniz 
contrasts probable arguments with conclusive ones, and probable reasons 
with demonstrations. Probability logic, he suggests, would be “a kind 
of logic which should determine the balance between probabilities” and 
should be used “when we pass beyond necessary arguments”.29 Further, in 
his Præcognita ad encyclopediam sive scientiam universalem [Forethoughts for 
an encyclopaedia or universal science], Leibniz contrasts propositions which 
are certain of themselves with those that are probable. He states:
Probability, however, is not something absolute, [it is] drawn from certain 
information which, although it does not suﬃce to resolve the problem, 
nevertheless ensures that we judge correctly which of the two opposites is 
the easiest (facilius) given the conditions known to us.30
In short, it is the type of investigation we use for all cases in which we deal 
with inconclusive, non-demonstrative evidence.
Leibniz regards logic as the “art of thinking”, which forms part of a 
universal science that includes inquiries into varied branches of study, 
such as physics, mathematics, as well as political, economic and other 
forms of inquiry.31 Hence he views the study of probability as continu-
ous with mathematical and scientific inquiry more generally. However, 
he also notes that as things stand in his time, this logic has not yet been 
developed. In a text from 1678–9, he notes: “And so, among other things, 
I work on a certain part of logic, thus far almost not touched on, about 
estimating degrees of probability and the balance of proofs, presump-
tions, conjectures and indications.”32 Among other places, in a letter from 
with “0” and “1” respectively (see: De conditionibus and De incerti aestimatione for early texts).
29 H 75, 90–1, 92.
30 A VI 4, 133–6.
31 For example, in his synopsis of the project of a general science (titled: Synopsis libri cui titulus est: 
initia et specimina scientiae novae generalis pro instauratione et augmentis scientiarum ad publicam 
felicitatem [Synopsis of a book of which the title is: beginnings and examples of a new universal science 
for the establishment and growth of sciences for public happiness] (1682), A VI 4, 442–3), Leibniz 
suggests that one of maxims of the art of good reasoning includes determining the probability of a 
principle under consideration.
32 A VI 4, 914.
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the late 1680s to Antoine Arnauld, Leibniz suggests that calculations of 
the probable will be very useful, but remain to be worked out.33 Let this 
stand as an outline of Leibniz’s approach to probability.
How does Leibniz take probability thus understood to apply to moral 
matters? Before answering that question, let me map out how Leibniz 
conceives of the moral domain.
4  Moral Affairs
Several of Leibniz’s writings bear on moral questions, broadly under-
stood.34 Many of his interests are meta-ethical in character, often having 
a legal or juridical slant, reflecting Leibniz’s background and training in 
law. Instances of Leibniz’s works on moral questions are early works such 
as those on conditions, jurisprudence and natural law, as well as later 
work such as texts on the concept of justice, his response to the work of 
Samuel V and of course, as always, his correspondences.35
Ethics, in Leibniz’s conception, concerns the practical domain, that is, 
the domain of choice and action, which includes questions about how to 
live well. Here we are concerned with what is right and what is good, or 
more specifically, with what is permissible or not permissible, obligatory 
or not obligatory, and so on. It becomes clear that Leibniz has a broad, 
inclusive conception of the moral domain as encompassing the more gen-
eral notion of justice.36 Normatively, Leibniz’s position cannot be neatly 
33 A II 2, 275–6.
34 Conform the traditional understanding of the notions, here I am using “ethics” and “morality” 
broadly interchangeably (cf. Gr. ἠθικός, Lat. moralis).
35 These include: Nova methodus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae [A new method for learning 
and teaching jurisprudence] (1667), A VI 1, 261–364; Specimina juris [Specimen of law] (1669), A 
VI 1 365–430; Elementa juris naturalis [Elements of natural law], also known as Definitio justitiæ 
universalis (1671–2), A VI 1, 431–85; Codex iuris gentium [Code of the law of nations] (1693); 
Elementa iuris perpetui [Elements of perpetual right] (1695); Meditation sur la notion commune de la 
justice [Meditation on the common concept of justice] (1703); Monita quaedam ad Samuelis Pufendorfii 
principia [Opinion on the principles of Pufendorf] (1706), Dutens IV.iii, 275–83. Selected secondary 
works on Leibniz’s ethics include: Martin, Leibnizens Ethik; Chevalier, La morale de Leibniz; Naert, 
Leibniz et la querelle du pur amour; Loemker, “Das Ethische Anliegen des Leibnizschen Systems”; 
Hostler, Leibniz’s Moral Philosophy; Riley, Leibniz’ Universal Jurisprudence; Johns, The Science of 
Right in Leibniz’s Moral and Political Philosophy.
36 Christopher Johns emphasizes the inclusive character of Leibniz’s notion of the moral domain; 
see his The Science of Right, 2.
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moulded into contemporary ethical categories. In broad terms, he comes 
close to what today would be labelled a consequentialist ethics, in which 
the focus is on achieving good outcomes. But it would be a sophisticated 
consequentialism, which bases a concern with outcomes in a framework of 
the rights and duties of rational substances.37 Ultimately, the main concern 
in matters of morality for Leibniz is with overall felicity and well-being.
As an adherent of natural law, Leibniz holds there to be a core set of ethi-
cal notions and principles to guide all human conduct.38 These principles are 
objective, natural and eternal. Crucially, they are also fundamentally ratio-
nal. We may already have an instinctive grasp of notions such as happiness, 
love, justice and obligation through our natural responses of conscience. 
However, in principle they can all be rationally formulated, explicated and 
demonstrated.39 The aim of such investigation is to determine which actions 
are good or bad, just or unjust, permissible or obligatory, and so on.
That Leibniz regards the scientific investigation of these fundamental 
principles as an a priori practice is already clear from his Nova metho-
dus discendae docendaeque jurisprudentiae [New method for learning and 
teaching jurisprudence] (1667), where he proposes to reform methods 
of jurisprudence by modelling them on geometrical, Euclidean proce-
dures—starting with definitions, and deducing a range of precepts from 
them (precepts are to include those such as “harm no one”, ”give each 
their due” and “live honourably”).40 In another work, Elementa juris 
naturalis [Elements of natural law] (1671–2), Leibniz states:
The doctrine of right is counted among those things, which do not depend 
on experience, but on definitions, not on sense, but on demonstrations of 
reason; and they are, so to say, matters of right and not of fact. For when 
37 Such a sophisticated consequentialism also comes out in Johns’ work (The Science of Right, viii).
38 This is one of the points Herbert Knecht gives a central place, in discussing the uses Leibniz envis-
ages for logic; see Knecht, La logique chez Leibniz, 309.
39 Leibniz’s approach to the rational investigation of moral principles has recently been elaborated 
by Martine de Gaudemar in a discussion of Leibniz’s rationalism in morality (de Gaudemar, 
“Leibniz and Moral Rationality”, 346). While accepting this model of an eternal set of necessary, 
objective and absolute moral truths that hold for all individuals, Leibniz is at the same time psycho-
logically realistic, in that he accepts that people will need to be led to these truths by means of 
considerations about pleasure, desire and the prospect of reward (viz. Hostler, Leibniz’s Moral 
Philosophy, 110).
40 Also certain sections of the Nouveaux Essais approach ethics as something of a demonstrative sci-
ence (viz. NE 88–9, 92–4, 352).
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justice consists in some form of congruity and proportionality, we can 
understand something to be just, even if there is no one who so counts it 
or is counted, and it is possible to predict that a house, a machine, a 
 republic would be beautiful, eﬀective, or happy, if it were to be in the 
future, even if that future never came to be.41
The thought is that the investigation into what is good and right ought 
to be focused on establishing proofs in understanding.42 For individu-
als conducting such investigation, it can ultimately contribute to moral 
development, and so to the attainment of happiness and perfection.
Given this account of the moral domain, how does Leibniz take the 
study of probability to be of relevance here? In the next section, I will give 
an overview of Leibniz’s conception of probability as applied to morality.
5  Probability in Moral Affairs
Here is a schematic reconstruction of how Leibniz appears to consider the 
relevance of probability in the moral domain (Leibniz does not explicitly 
give this argumentative structure. Rather, it figures implicitly in the back-
ground of some of his discussions):
 1. The study of probability allows one to better assess cases that involve 
probable arguments.
 2. Probable notions and arguments figure in numerous cases of moral 
reasoning.
 3. The study of probability allows one to better assess numerous cases of 
moral reasoning.
In the foregoing, I have established that Leibniz accepts the first premise. 
That he also endorses the second is clear from various texts. For example, 
in a short tract from 1670 on the foundations of law, Leibniz states:
41 A VI 1, 460.
42 See also Herbert Knecht, who elaborates how for Leibniz a priori rational investigation, not 
experience, lies at the foundation of legal and ethical systems. The scientific investigation of moral 
principles, in turn, is understood as contributing to a development towards perfection and 
happiness (Knecht, La logique chez Leibniz, Chap. VII §4).
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Probable argumentation proceeds from the nature of a thing or from 
human opinion. From the nature of a thing in turn comes either presump-
tion or conjecture. It is presumption when the proposed statement results 
necessarily from manifest truths, with nothing preventing it. A judgement 
ought then always be rendered in favour of those who have the presump-
tion going for them, except when an adversary demonstrates the contrary. 
Such is the majority of reasoning in morality.43
Here Leibniz clarifies that most of the reasoning about morality is  probable 
argumentation of the sort that can be called “presumption”, namely prob-
able arguments proceeding from the nature of a thing. Other texts from 
1677–8 directly contrast considerations about the practical conduct of 
life—including concerns about right ways to act—with demonstrative 
reasoning.44 These works support the idea that Leibniz would indeed also 
embrace the second premise.
Leibniz equally accepts the conclusion of the argument. In general, 
Leibniz saw great merit in approaching ethical questions with the same 
rigour as is commonplace in geometry or mathematics. The belief that 
scientific inquiry can help advance human well-being is apparent from 
many of the titles of texts belonging to his project of developing a uni-
versal science, which Leibniz says aim at human happiness (ad humanam 
felicitatem or ad publicam felicitatem).45 Given that Leibniz envisages a 
logic of probability to be part of this universal science, then to the extent 
that instances of this science advance well-being, so too does the science 
of probability. Further, it also stands out in explicit statements. For exam-
43 A VI 4, 2789.
44 Robert Adams suggests in a discussion of Leibniz on possibility, that Leibniz took all probable, 
non-demonstrative reasoning to belong to the practical sphere; see his Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, 
Idealist, 198.
45 Examples of Leibniz titles on a universal science that indicate that they are intended for the 
increase of public well-being are: “Guilielmi Pacidii plus ultra sive initia et specimina scientiae 
generalis de instauratione et augmentis scientiarum, ac de perficienda mente, rerumque inventioni-
bus ad publicam felicitatem”; “Guilielmi Pacidii Lubentiani aurora seu initia scientiae generalis a 
Divina Luce ad humanam felicitatem”; “Synopsis libri cui titulus est: Initia et specimina scientiae 
novae Generalis pro Instauratione et augmentis scientiarum ad publicam felicitatem”; “Guilielmi 
Pacidii initia et specimina scientiae generalis sive de instauratione et augmentis scientiarum in 
publicam felicitatem” (GP VII 49ﬀ.).
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ple, in one of his studies towards a universal science, Leibniz comments 
on the usefulness of probability in practice:
Even when it concerns nothing but probabilities, one can always determine 
that which is most likely ex datis. It is true that this part of the useful logic 
is not yet found anywhere, but it would be of wonderful use in practice, 
when it concerns presumptions, indications and conjectures, to know the 
degrees of probability, when there is a quantity of reasons apparent both on 
the one and the other side in an important deliberation.46
The above suggests that moral and practical considerations are connected. 
Such a tie would fit well with the point, presented earlier, that Leibniz works 
with a broad, inclusive notion of the moral sphere (concerning questions 
about what is right, deliberation over what is good, and generally what aﬀects 
the balance of goodness and well-being). Not everything that Leibniz consid-
ers part of morality is what we would nowadays identify as concrete moral 
dilemmas (such as trolley problems); an overlap between morality and prac-
tice does not come with such a restriction. But there is a reasonable ground 
for thinking that even if Leibniz does not regard the practical and the moral 
as strictly identical, he treats them as broadly overlapping domains.
How would Leibniz’s sketched approach to probability in the moral 
sphere be applicable to more concrete cases of moral decision-making? As 
stated, Leibniz only developed his position on the application of probabil-
ity in the moral domain at a high level of abstraction. His remarks on this 
subject available to us stay largely programmatic and anticipatory, instead 
of focused on actual case studies. Nevertheless, it is still possible to identify 
the outlines of his stance towards actual examples contained in his discus-
sion. Here I will discuss two of these, suggested in passing by Leibniz him-
self. The first concerns what we would now identify as distributive justice; 
the second concerns what is today known as the field of decision theory.
One area in which Leibniz’s stance is indirectly shaped by his thinking 
about probability—in particular about games of chance—is in consid-
erations about justice, such as questions of just distribution. At points 
Leibniz suggests a principle of distribution, according to which a good is 
to be distributed in proportion to the likelihood of the claim that each of 
46 A VI 4 A, 706–7.
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the claimants makes to that good. In a 1687 letter to the German jurist 
Vincent Placcius (1642–99) he writes:
For example, if persons L and M both lay claim to a sum of 30 on the same 
legal grounds, and neither [of them] held it in their possession over the other, 
nor is to be preferred on another [legal] ground, and his [M’s] claim is twice 
as probable [than L’s], truly this law is to be employed; natural justice, I say, 
would be that a proportional division is to be made between them.47
And in the Nouveaux Essais, he describes how agricultural labourers in 
Lower Saxony apply a method of taking the arithmetic mean between 
several equally probable hypotheses about the value of a certain good:
For example, when some inheritance or land is to be sold, they create three 
groups of assessors … and each group assesses the commodity in question. 
Suppose then that the one estimates it at the value of 1000 crowns, the 
other at 1400, the third at 1500; one takes the sum of the three estimates, 
which is 3900, and because there were three groups, one takes a third of 
this, which is 1300 for the mean value sought; or, which is the same thing, 
one takes the sum of one third of each estimate. This is the axiom: aequali-
bus aequalia, for like hypotheses one must have like consideration. But 
when the hypotheses are unlike, one compares them with another.48
A common line in these cases is the idea that equally probable claims 
are to be given proportional consideration. At the same time, the precise 
thoughts here diﬀer. In the one instance it concerns how such propor-
tional weight comes in with the distribution of a good to which multiple 
parties lay a claim, whereas in the other instance it is used to help identify 
the value of a good (without assuming that any of the assessors would lay 
a claim to it). Hence it is not clear that Leibniz advances a single, uniform 
principle of distributive justice here (although he has been interpreted 
in that way).49 What is clear, however, is that Leibniz explores ways of 
47 A II 2, 145.
48 NE 465.
49 Nicholas Rescher (“Leibniz, Keynes, and the Rabbis on a Problem of Distributive Justice”) has 
argued that Leibniz advances a general proportionality principle of distributive justice. Rescher 
points out that, while such a principle may look appealing, in fact it is highly problematic, because 
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distributing goods and weighing of evidence that could form the basis of 
such a principle.
A diﬀerent example shows Leibniz moving in the direction of decision 
theory. In his Elements of Natural Law, after having criticized a compet-
ing view, Leibniz tries out the following:
Then finally, therefore, probabilities are to be followed, when the ratio of 
the probable eﬀects is greater than [that of ] the reciprocal, or if it is much 
more probable for act A to have a better eﬀect than B, than for B [to be 
better] than A. Or if the product of the multiplication of the probability 
with goodness is greater with A than [with] B. Let the probability of A be 
5, its goodness 4. The product would be 20. Let the probability of B be 6, 
[its] goodness 3, the product would be 18. Therefore it would be better to 
follow A rather than B, even if it is less probable.50
Act A could for example be the act of charging interest on one’s loan, and 
B the act of charging a fixed service fee for providing the loan. We can 
schematize this as shown in Table 2.
Here I take it that Leibniz understands the probability of an act as 
the probability of a certain outcome associated with that act occurring 
(not the probability of the act itself occurring). It is, roughly, the 
probability that the act will be successful. On Leibniz’s proposal, in the 
current case the optimal course of action would be act A, because its 
product of probability and quality is greatest.51
it conflates problems of judicial allocation with problems of fair division in gambling. In particular, 
he objects that in disputes about pre-existing ownership, injustice will always be done when divid-
ing a good proportionally among its claimants. Rescher is right in pointing out these diﬃculties 
about a blanket use of a proportionality principle. However, as indicated, it is not clear that Leibniz 
did in fact endorse such a uniform, universal principle.
50 A VI 1, 71.
51 What Leibniz refers to as “quality” (bonitas) here is what nowadays would be called “utility”.
Table 2 Competing courses of action (Leibniz)
Probability Quality Product
Act A 5 4 20
Act B 6 3 18
Leibniz and Probability in the Moral Domain 245
Leibniz applies a probability calculation to determine optimal courses 
of action.52 This has a moral dimension, given that we include in this cal-
culation an assessment of the respective goodness of each of these acts. 
Assessing an act’s probability hence can give people a tool in determining 
how to act, and so can help them make moral choices. There are straight-
forward diﬃculties with what Leibniz carves out here. For one thing, where 
do the numbers come from? That is, how do we determine that act A has 
a quality of 4 and act B of 5? Further, it is an act with minimal quality but 
very high probability that could get a score equal to or higher than an act 
with a high quality but low probability. But does that really mean that it 
would be a better choice? The schematic, exploratory character of his work 
here prevents Leibniz from directly addressing these or similar issues.
Might there be cases where calculations of probability would not 
be useful to moral decision-making? Of course there are. As indicated, 
Leibniz understands assessments of probability to contrast with, and 
complement, any form of reasoning which involves demonstration or 
concerns necessary truths. When dealing with necessities, there remains 
no need to calculate probable outcomes. This general principle about the 
usefulness of probability assessments holds generally, and so also in the 
sub-domain of morality.
The approach to probability that Leibniz advances here diﬀers from 
the scholastic moral probabilist account as discussed earlier. Probabilism 
deems an action probable, and therefore permissible, purely on the basis 
of external support for that course of action, either by reason or by a 
weighty authority. That is what Leibniz rejects. In the above example, 
Leibniz uses the intrinsic features of an act’s probability (understood as 
the ease or facility of resulting in a certain outcome) and its quality to 
identify the optimal choice. It is an attempt at introducing mathematics, 
and therewith measures of degrees, into moral aﬀairs.
When probability theory was nascent in the late seventeenth century, 
Leibniz was one of the few who explicitly sought to apply assessments of 
52 In contemporary debates in fields such as economics, finance or game theory, the notion of 
expected utility is generally appealed to as a measure of preferences over a set of choices with uncer-
tain outcomes. Leibniz’s discussion presented here does not in fact capture the notion of “utility” in 
these discussions, at least in part because he does not conceptualize the choice between competing 
options as one of subjective preference.
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probability to the moral domain. Most other investigations into uses of 
probability in this period concentrated on mathematical puzzles, in partic-
ular relating to games of chance, insurance and annuities. This is precisely 
the sort of material that Leibniz got acquainted with during his stay in 
Paris (1672–6), when studying the work of Pierre de Fermat (1601–65), 
Blaise Pascal (1623–62) and Christiaan Huygens (1629–95). The fact that 
Leibniz sought to extend the uses of probability beyond the purely math-
ematical makes him something of a pioneer on this line of inquiry.
He was not the only one, however. Another person concerned with 
the moral side of probability was the mathematician Jakob Bernoulli 
(1654–1705), with whom Leibniz corresponded for some time. Bernoulli 
was one of the few who, like Leibniz, envisaged the application of prob-
ability calculations to ethical cases. The exchange between Bernoulli and 
Leibniz in the early 1700s helps to bring out some of the limits Leibniz 
conceived in the application of probability theory to ethics.
6  Limits of Probability
Leibniz had maintained an active correspondence with members of the 
Bernoulli family since the late 1690s. In April 1703 Leibniz writes to 
Jakob Bernoulli. In the postscript of his letter, Leibniz says that he has 
heard that Bernoulli has been working on estimating likelihoods, and 
that he would like to see all of Bernoulli’s work. Their discussion of prob-
ability unfolds from there. In the course of this discussion, two points 
of divergence between the two authors stand out. One of these diﬀer-
ences concerns the extent of the use of probability with respect to practi-
cal aﬀairs. Is the calculation of probabilities about moral cases always 
most useful? Bernoulli strongly believed it was. He announced that he 
would devote the entire last part of his book in progress—published 
posthumously in 1713 as Ars conjectandi [The art of conjecturing]—to 
“how to apply the principles of the art of estimation to civil, moral, and 
economic aﬀairs”.53 When Bernoulli mentions his plan to Leibniz, the 
latter responds with encouragement as well as some reservation:
53 GM III 1, 77.
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The estimation of probabilities is extremely useful, although in several 
political and legal situations there is not as much need for fine calculation 
as there is for the accurate recapitulation of all the circumstances.54
This signals one limit Leibniz saw in the use of probability theory in the 
practical domain. While he evidently regards it as relevant, he does not 
assume that it is appropriate in all cases. Sometimes it is more urgent to get 
the facts right.
A second point of divergence arises when Bernoulli presents Leibniz 
with a puzzle that the former has been thinking about for a while. 
Bernoulli’s puzzle is: How much more probable is it for a twenty-year-old 
to survive a sixty-year-old, than vice versa?55 Here Bernoulli asks about 
the ratio of twenty-year-olds who survive sixty-year-olds, or the prob-
ability of the one surviving the other. In response to his own puzzle, 
Bernoulli makes a suggestion:
For had I observed it to have happened that a young man outlived his 
respective old man in one thousand cases, for example, and to have hap-
pened otherwise only five hundred times, I could safely enough conclude 
that it is twice as probable that a young man outlives an old man as it is that 
the latter outlives the former.56
That is, Bernoulli optimistically suggests that, with enough observations, 
one can get to the true ratio or probability with ever increasing preci-
sion.57 If, in idealized conditions, the number of observations could 
54 GM III 1, 83. In the background to their discussion is the fact that Bernoulli inclines towards 
what, in contemporary debates, is labelled a “subjective” interpretation of probability. On a subjec-
tive interpretation, probability is understood as a degree of certainty. He states: “Probability then is 
a degree of certainty, & diﬀers from this like a part from the whole”, and “We call that one more 
probable therefore, which has the greater part of certainty”. In: Jakob Bernoulli, Ars conjectandi, 
IV.iv §1.
55 GM III 1, 77.
56 GM III 1, 77.
57 The position that Bernoulli puts forward here is close to what would today be called a “frequen-
tist” approach to probability. However, Bernoulli cannot be pinned down as a strict frequentist, 
because, as noted before, he also inclines towards a subjective interpretation of probability as a 
degree of certainty. For discussion of Bernoulli’s position and its impact, see David, Games, Gods & 
Gambling, 130–9; Hald, A History of Probability and Statistics and Their Applications Before 1750, 
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extend to infinity, then one could be certain of that figure.58 (In practice, 
Bernoulli suggest that if a hundred or thousand observations confirm the 
same ratio, this suﬃces for being morally certain of the correctness of 
that ratio.59) In short, the thought is that the chance of an accurate ratio 
increases steadily as the number of observations grows, so that one can in 
principle investigate the ratio between the numbers of possible outcomes 
a posteriori with as much certainty as when one investigates a priori.60 
Leibniz disagrees:
When we estimate empirically, by means of experiments, the probabilities 
of successes, you ask whether a perfect estimation can be finally obtained 
in this manner. You write that you have found this to be so. There appears 
to me to be a diﬃculty in this conclusion: that happenings which depend 
upon an infinite number of cases cannot be determined by a finite number 
of experiments; indeed, nature has her own habits, born from the return of 
causes, but only ‘in general’.61
Leibniz points out that actual observations will always be finite in num-
ber, as one cannot ever make an infinite number of them. Hence, on the 
basis of observation will always be finite in number, one cannot ever get 
to genuine certainty.62 This disagreement ties in with, but is not a strict 
result of, Leibniz’s earlier mentioned view that the study of probability is 
a branch of logic, conducted a priori. Indeed, it comes up in the context 
of drawing inferences on the basis of observations. But Bernoulli and 
chap. 15; Shaﬀer “The Significance of Jacob Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi for the Philosophy of prob-
ability today”.
58 The thought that Bernoulli hits on is the “law of large numbers”; the thesis that, for repeated, 
independent trials with the same probability of success in each trial, the chance that there will be a 
positive percentage diﬀerence between the expected values and actual values will converge to zero 
as the number of trials goes to infinity. For a formal statement, see: Kolmogorov, Foundations of the 
Theory of Probability, VI §6, 61–4.
59 GM III 1, 88. In Ars conjectandi (IV.iv §1) Bernoulli explicates “morally certain” as follows: 
“Morally certain is that of which the probability has near perfect certainty, such that one cannot 
sense any shortfall; Morally impossible, by contrast, is that which only has probability to the extent 
that it is morally certain that all certainty is lacking.”
60 GM III 1, 78.
61 GM III 1, 83.
62 Leibniz’s response to Bernoulli on this point can also be viewed as part of a more general scepti-
cism about induction. For a discussion of this point, see Parmentier, L’estime des apparances, 32.
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Leibniz disagree not over whether inferences from statistical data are ever 
legitimate or not. Both Bernoulli and Leibniz agree that they are. Their 
dispute concerns the epistemic outcome of such inferences; whether this 
can indeed be one of certainty (Bernoulli’s view), or whether it will be 
restricted to high confidence based on repeated confirmation (Leibniz’s 
view).
This, then, constitutes another core diﬀerence between the two 
authors. Moreover, it indicates a further limit to Leibniz’s stance 
towards the use of probability in the moral domain. He did not think 
that one could ever get certainty on the basis of empirical observations, 
that is, from statistical data. Given that the two limits brought out 
here are general limits to the use of probability, they will equally hold 
for the application of probability to moral aﬀairs, such as when we 
are considering just distributions or deliberating between competing 
courses of action. Hence according to Leibniz, in the moral domain 
too it will sometimes be more relevant to get the facts right than to 
proceed with potentially complicated calculations, and we cannot get 
to certainty about ratios on the basis of statistical data.
7  Conclusion
The framework for thinking about Leibniz on the use of probability 
in the moral domain that I have developed here is as follows. Leibniz 
rejects a version of scholastic moral probabilism, according to which 
whether something is probable depends on its being supported by 
external factors, namely by reason or authority. Instead, Leibniz cap-
tures probability as an objective feature of things in the world, and is 
a strong proponent of applying that conception of probability to the 
moral domain, inclusively understood. Calculations of probability 
can assist when deciding about actions concerned with what is good 
or bad, permissible or impermissible, or obligatory or not. Ultimately, 
he takes this application of the science of probability to contribute to 
advancing human well-being.
At the same time, I have also shown that Leibniz did see limits to the 
application of probability theory in the moral domain. First, he believes 
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that calculating probabilities is not the most useful thing to do in all cases; 
getting the facts right may prove more crucial. Second, unlike Bernoulli, 
he holds that one can never, not even in principle, get certainty about 
likelihoods based on empirical data.63
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